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A NEW ARROW IN THE QUIVER OF FEDERAL 
SECURITIES FRAUD PROSECUTORS: SECTION 
807 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
(18 U.S.C. § 1348) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Last year, U.S. citizens lost approximately $40 billion to securities 
fraud schemes.1 The recent escalation of securities-related scandals 
typified by Enron and WorldCom has seriously weakened the U.S. 
economy.2 To respond, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20023 
(the “SOA”) and, in particular, a new federal securities fraud statute (the 
“Securities Fraud Statute”).4
Congress enacted the Securities Fraud Statute for three primary 
reasons.5 First, gaps in federal securities and criminal fraud laws at least 
partially induced an increased number of securities fraud schemes during 
the past decade.6 Congress enacted the statute to close this gap and make it 
easier for prosecutors to convict defrauders.7 Second, Congress sought to 
give federal prosecutors an elastic rule that would enable them to 
 1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, About the Economic Crimes Unit: Securities/Commodities 
Fraud, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/fc/ec/about/about_scf.htm (last visited Sept. 09, 2002) 
[hereinafter Economic Crimes Unit] (“Securities regulators and other prominent groups have estimated 
that securities and commodities fraud totals approximately $40 billion per year.”).  
 2. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002) (“In the wake of the continuing Enron Corporation debacle, 
the trust of the United States’ investors and pensioners in the nation’s stock market has been seriously 
eroded. This is bad for our markets, bad for our economy, and bad for the future growth of investment 
in American companies.”) (internal abbreviation omitted).  
 3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).  
 4. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (West 2003). The Securities Fraud Statute reads as follows: 
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice— 
 (1) to defraud any person in connection with any security of an issuer with a class of 
securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l) 
or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. 78o(d)); or  
 (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any 
money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any security of an issuer with a 
class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78l) or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d));  
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both. 
 5. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2-6, 10-11, 14, 20, 30. 
 6. Id. at 5-6, 10-11, 20, 30.  
 7. Id. 
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prosecute yet unforeseen classes of schemes.8 Third, Congress wove a stiff 
twenty-five year sentence into the statute to deter securities fraud more 
effectively.9
Although there have not yet been any prosecutions under the Securities 
Fraud Statute, to convict securities defrauders under section 1 of the 
statute prosecutors should be required to prove that the defendant (1) 
knowingly, with the intent to defraud, (2) executed or attempted to execute 
a scheme or artifice to defraud another person (3) in connection with a 
security of a publicly traded company.10 Alternatively, to convict a 
defendant under section 2 of the statute, courts should require prosecutors 
to prove that the defendant (1) knowingly, with the intent to defraud, (2) 
executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to obtain money or 
property by false or fraudulent representations, pretenses, or promises (3) 
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security of a publicly traded 
company.11  
On the one hand, it appears that the Securities Fraud Statute will 
significantly impact federal securities fraud prosecutions.12 First, the 
statute will make it easier, in a limited number of cases, for federal 
prosecutors to convict securities defrauders.13 Second, the elements of the 
Securities Fraud Statute are flexible enough to enable federal prosecutors 
to keep up with the most complex new fraud schemes that inventive 
criminals may devise in the future.14 Third, the Securities Fraud Statute 
has a tough twenty-five-year sentence that will effectively deter many 
potential violators and thus enable federal agents and prosecutors to target 
particularly egregious schemes.15  
On the other hand, it seems like the Securities Fraud Statute will only 
nominally impact federal securities fraud prosecutions.16 First, the mail 
and wire fraud statutes are written17 and interpreted18 flexibly, and it seems 
like these “catch-all” provisions cover nearly all securities fraud 
schemes.19 Second, even though the Securities Fraud Statute eliminates the 
 8. Id. at 11, 14, 20. 
 9. Id. at 2, 6, 11. 
 10. See infra notes 84-136 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 137-59 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 170-90 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text. 
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need for prosecutors to prove the technical elements such as reliance20 and 
the use of interstate commerce or mail21 that inhere in section 10(b) of the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act (“section 10(b)”)22 and Securities and 
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”),23 the elements of the 
Securities Fraud Statute and these two other securities laws largely 
overlap.24 Third, the Securities Fraud Statute will not enable prosecutors to 
target some of the most pervasive and pernicious schemes that have 
evolved during the past decade,25 including Micro-Cap schemes,26 prime 
bank schemes,27 and many Internet transaction schemes.28  
This Note will (1) explain the origin and purpose of the Securities 
Fraud Statute, (2) identify the elements federal prosecutors should be 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict individuals under 
the statute, (3) assess whether the statute will have any practical impact on 
federal securities fraud prosecutions, and (4) propose that Congress should 
broaden the scope of the new statute.29
II. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE SECURITIES FRAUD STATUTE  
The Enron debacle and subsequent plethora of corporate scandals 
prompted members of the Senate Judiciary Committee30 (the “Judiciary 
Committee”) to introduce the Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability Act of 2002 (the “CCFAA”),31 and, in particular, the 
Securities Fraud Statute. At the behest of Senators Leahy and McCain,32 
 20. See Twiss v. Kury, 25 F.3d 1551, 1558 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating elements of a Rule 10b-5 
offense); Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that reliance is a requirement 
under Rule 10b-5); United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding that 
defendant committed no crime because the government failed to prove the identity of the defrauded 
investors and failed to demonstrate a connection between the victims and the alleged scheme).  
 21. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997) (stating that the use of interstate 
commerce is a necessary element of Rule 10b-5 violations). 
 22. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2003). 
 23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).  
 24. See infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 182-90 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra note 65. 
 27. See infra note 66. 
 28. See infra note 67. 
 29. See infra notes 191-207 and accompanying text. Congress should extend the reach of the 
Securities Fraud Statute to any fraud scheme that connects to a “contrived security.” This language 
would expand the scope of illicit activities that the government can prosecute under the statute beyond 
the scope of activities already illegalized under federal securities and fraud laws.  
 30. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2-6 (2002). 
 31. The Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, S. 2010, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 32. See 148 CONG. REC. S1785-89 (2002) (statement of Senator Leahy); 148 CONG. REC. S6528-
29 (2002) (statement of Senator McCain).  
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the Senate incorporated the CCFAA into the Public Company Accounting 
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (the “PCARIPA”),33 which 
the Senate passed on July 15, 2002.34 Simultaneously, the House of 
Representatives drafted the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 
(the “CFAA”).35 The CFAA contained a securities fraud provision with 
language identical to that in the Securities Fraud Statute drafted by the 
Senate,36 subject to just one exception: the Senate version imposed a 
maximum sentence of ten years in prison,37 while the House version 
imposed a maximum sentence of twenty-five years in prison.38 The House 
and Senate held a joint conference to reconcile the conflicting bills39 and 
filed a conference report on July 24, 2002.40 This conference report 
contained the text of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and incorporated the 
Securities Fraud Statute, the CCFAA, and the PCARIPA.41 The twenty-
five-year maximum sentence proposed by the House ultimately 
prevailed.42
According to the Judiciary Committee, Congress enacted the Securities 
Fraud Statute for three primary reasons.43 First, the Enron debacle and 
subsequent escalation of corporate scandals revealed significant gaps in 
federal securities and criminal fraud laws.44 For example, although 
 33. See 148 CONG. REC. S6436-39 (2002) (text of measure incorporated into Amendment No. 
4174 to PCARIPA, S. 2673, 107th Cong. (2002)).  
 34. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: LAW AND EXPLANATION 159 (James Hamilton & Ted 
Trautmann eds., 2002) [hereinafter Hamilton].  
 35. H.R. 5118, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 36. H.R. 5118 § (2)(c). 
 37. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 34 (2002) (“[S]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, or both.”) (emphasis added). 
 38. H.R. 5118 § (2)(c) (“[S]hall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, 
or both.”) (emphasis added).  
 39. Hamilton, supra note 34, at 159. 
 40. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107-610 (2002). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See supra note 4. 
 43. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2-7, 10-11, 20, 30 (2002). Because the House minimally 
modified the draft of the Securities Fraud Statute that the Senate Judiciary Committee originally 
authored, the Judiciary Committee’s report has the greatest probative value regarding Congress’ 
reasons for enacting the statute, as well as the elements Congress intended courts to read into it. 
 44. See id. at 2-7, 10-11, 14, 20, 30. See also Stephen M. Cutler, Director of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission Division of Enforcement, Address at the University of Michigan Law School 
(Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch604.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002). 
Director Cutler describes the retrenchment in federal securities laws that occurred during the 1990’s: 
Why didn’t the potential costs to auditors [of companies like Enron and WorldCom] of 
passing on inaccurate financials, for example, impel them to fulfill their gatekeeper role? 
Why did they apparently believe they stood a good chance of getting away with it, so to 
speak? One answer lies in the changes in the legal landscape during the last decade, which 
substantially limited the exposure of secondary actors to private securities fraud liability. 
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Congress enacted bank fraud,45 health care fraud,46 and even bankruptcy 
fraud statutes,47 Congress failed to enact a criminal securities fraud 
provision.48 To convict securities defrauders, federal prosecutors often had 
to rely on the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes,49 both of which carried 
maximum sentences of only five years imprisonment.50 Moreover, these 
provisions required federal prosecutors to “carry the sometimes awkward 
burden”51 of proving that defendants used the interstate mail or wire 
networks to further their schemes.52 Alternatively, federal prosecutors had 
 The first step down this path came with the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Central 
Bank of Denver [Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 
(1994)], which eliminated aiding and abetting liability in private lawsuits under Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act. Since professionals like attorneys and auditors frequently are viewed as 
having only an indirect or secondary role in the fraud, Central Bank significantly limited their 
legal exposure in most settings.  
 In 1995, with the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA), Congress provided further comfort to gatekeepers by confirming that an aiding and 
abetting theory could be pursued only by the SEC (not by private plaintiffs). It also placed 
additional restrictions on securities class actions.  
 Specifically, the PSLRA imposed a heightened standard for pleading scienter, including 
requiring a complaint to specify each statement alleged to be misleading, the reasons why it is 
misleading, and to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.” In addition, it seems to have influenced at 
least one circuit to heighten not only the standard for pleading scienter, but also the 
substantive standard for proving scienter. The Ninth Circuit, in In re Silicon Graphics [183 
F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999)], arguably nudged the scienter requirement from simple recklessness 
to something called “deliberate” recklessness. 
 . . . .  
 The burdens of the PSLRA prompted an immediate reaction from securities class action 
plaintiffs’ attorneys — they sought out friendlier fora in state courts. Not to be outflanked, 
however, Congress responded by adopting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 
1998 (SLUSA), which had the effect of preempting most securities fraud class actions filed in 
state court.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 45. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 2003). 
 46. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1347 (West 2003). 
 47. 18 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West 2003). 
 48. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6. See also id. at 20. (“[U]nlike bank fraud or health care fraud, there 
is no generally accessible statute that deals with the specific problem of securities fraud.”); 148 CONG. 
REC. at S6439 (2002) (remarks of Senator Leahy) (“As one who was a prosecutor, I was surprised to 
learn that unlike bank fraud, health care fraud, and even bankruptcy fraud, there is no specific Federal 
crime of securities fraud to protect victims of fraud related to publicly traded companies.”). 
 49. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2003) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West 2003) (wire 
fraud).  
 50. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6, 20. Sections 903(a) and (b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increased 
the maximum sentence for mail and wire fraud from five years to twenty years. See infra note 186.  
 51. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6. 
 52. Id. Because the mail fraud statute applies to any person who “deposits or causes to be 
deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate 
carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing,” the “mailing in furtherance” 
requirement generally does not impede successful prosecutions. But see ELLEN S. PODGOR & JEROLD 
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to prove willful violations of complex, technical securities laws such as 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.53 The technical requirements of these 
securities laws, such as the “purchase or sale” requirement,54 may be 
difficult to satisfy.55 According to the Judiciary Committee, Congress 
enacted the Securities Fraud Statute to close these legal gaps and make it 
easier for federal prosecutors to convict securities defrauders.56  
Second, Congress sought to give federal prosecutors an elastic statute 
that would enable them to prosecute yet unforeseen securities fraud 
schemes.57 The Judiciary Committee thus modeled the Securities Fraud 
Statute on the extremely flexible bank fraud and health care fraud 
statutes,58 which, in turn are modeled on the mail fraud59 and wire fraud60 
statutes. The Judiciary Committee reasoned that writing the Securities 
Fraud Statute expansively would provide “needed enforcement 
H. ISRAEL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN A NUTSHELL 66-71 (2d ed. 1997). Professors Podgor and Israel 
highlight four limitations courts have traditionally imposed on the “mailing in furtherance” 
requirement: “Mailings which conflicted with the scheme, were an imperative command of duty 
imposed by the state, occurred prior to commencement of the scheme, or occurred after fruition of the 
scheme, were found not to be in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.” Id. at 66-67.  
 53. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (“[P]rosecutors may charge a willful violation of certain specific 
securities laws or regulations, but such regulations often contain technical legal requirements, and 
proving willful violations of these complex regulations allows defendants to argue that they did not 
possess the requisite criminal intent.”).  
 54. See SEC v. Zandford, 238 F.3d 559, 564 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that by stealing investors’ 
money, the defendant did not violate Rule 10b-5 because the act of stealing investors money is related 
too tenuously to the purchase or sale of a security), cited with disapproval in S. REP. No. 107-146, at 6, 
rev’d, SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).  
 55. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.  
 56. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6, 11, 20. The Judiciary Committee emphasized that “[i]n our view, 
this provision will make it easier, in a limited class of cases, for prosecutors to prove securities fraud 
by eliminating, for example, the element that the mails or wires were used to further the scheme to 
defraud.” Id. at 30. See also 148 CONG. REC. S6528 (statement of Senator McCain) (“The [securities 
fraud] provision makes it easier, in a limited class of cases, to prove securities fraud.”).  
 57. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 11, 14. The Judiciary Committee emphasized that “[t]he [securities 
fraud] provision should not be read to require proof of technical elements from the securities laws, and 
is intended to provided needed enforcement flexibility in the context of publicly traded companies to 
protect shareholders and prospective shareholders against all the types [of] schemes and frauds which 
inventive criminals may devise in the future.” Id. at 20. See also 148 CONG. REC. S6437 (2002) 
(statement of Senator Daschle) (“[The Securities Fraud Statute] provides prosecutors with a new tool 
that is flexible enough to keep up with the most complex new fraud schemes . . . .”).  
 58. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 2003) (bank fraud); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1347 (West 2003) (health care 
fraud). S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14, 20, 30. For example, the Senate emphasized that “[l]ike the bank 
and health care fraud statutes on which this provision is modeled, prosecutors must prove that a 
defendant knowingly engaged in a scheme or artifice to defraud, or knowingly made false statements 
or representations to obtain money in a securities transaction.” Id. at 30. The Senate also indicated that 
“[t]he provision would supplement the patchwork of existing technical securities law violations with a 
more general and less technical provision, with elements and intent requirements comparable to 
current bank fraud and health care fraud statutes.” Id. at 14.  
 59. See infra note 94. 
 60. See infra note 95. 
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flexibility”61 to federal prosecutors and help to protect the nation’s 
shareholders “against all the types [of] schemes and frauds which 
inventive criminals may devise in the future.”62 In the Senate Report, the 
Judiciary Committee failed to explain specifically the need for such 
flexibility.63  
This need is apparent, however. During the past two decades, the 
evolution of new, complicated investment vehicles, coupled with 
technological advances, enabled clever criminals to devise and execute a 
host of previously unimaginable securities fraud schemes.64 These include 
Micro-Cap schemes,65 prime bank schemes,66 Internet transaction 
schemes,67 Ponzi schemes,68 and market manipulation schemes.69 
 61. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 20. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Economic Crimes Unit, supra note 1. 
 65. Id. Micro-Cap schemes account for approximately $10 billion in annual frauds. Id. The FBI 
explains these schemes: “Micro-Cap fraud typically involves high pressure telephone sales of risky 
and low-priced stock, generally in start-up companies with little or no track record. Often, their stocks 
are sold by unregistered brokers who call investors from boiler rooms, using elaborate scripts.” Id. 
 66. Peter Schenck, Overview of Securities Fraud Schemes at 5, contained in Securities Fraud 
Prosecution Manual, Department of Justice Office of Legal Education (2000) [hereinafter Schenck]. 
According to Peter Schenck, the Chief of the Fraud Division of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s 
United States Attorney’s Office, prime bank schemes can be described as follows:  
Prime bank schemes involve the investment in fanciful notes, debentures, letters of credit, and 
guarantees which are purported to be issued by “prime” banks or “prime” European banks. 
These are often allusions to secret financial networks which are usually closed to the average 
investor. High, often absurdly high, interest rates are guaranteed. Often there is a guarantee of 
no risk, with the victim’s money to remain in a reputable bank’s escrow account as collateral 
for the deal.  
Id. See also Joel E. Leising & Michael McGarry, Prime Bank/High Yield Investment Schemes, United 
States Attorneys’ Bulletin 10, 11 (Mar. 2002); Economic Crimes Unit, supra note 1. The FBI explains 
prime bank investments:  
[Prime bank investments] are fraudulently sold as if from financial instruments of well-
known domestic or foreign financial institutions, the World Bank, or a country’s central bank. 
The financial instruments may be sold as notes, letters of credit, debentures, or guarantees. 
The schemes include false claims of high rates of return, of being “risk free,” of the financial 
instrument being traded on a worldwide secret exchange, and of being issued in formats 
approved and/or sanctioned by the Federal Reserve, the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) or other well-known international organizations. 
Id.  
 67. Schenck, supra note 66, at 6. Peter Schneck explains the role of the Internet in securities 
fraud:  
The internet is used as a vehicle for the traditional frauds . . . with the added danger of instant 
saturation of a huge potential market. Bulk e-mailing (spamming) reaches large numbers at a 
small cost. Software is cheaply available to harvest thousands of e-mail addresses from 
internet files and create mailing lists, so at a fraction of the cost of a boiler room mass 
solicitations can be sent out. Fraudsters can also create e-mail message [sic] which appear to 
be internal memos from well known investment firms, inducing the recipient of the 
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Investment brokers also invented and executed predatory schemes such as 
churning,70 self-dealing,71 skimming,72 and front running.73 Finally, 
corporate executives invented and implemented new, aggressive book-
“misdirected” email to invest. Internet users tend to view the net as a trusted community . . . . 
They will be more susceptible to internet solicitations than to a high pressure telephone call.  
Id. See also Securities and Exchange Commission, Internet Fraud: How to Avoid Internet Investment 
Scams, available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/cyberfraud.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). The 
SEC discusses numerous ways in which creative criminals have used the Internet to execute previously 
non-existent fraud schemes. Id. For example, perpetrators send out fraudulent online newsletters, post 
fraudulent online bulletin boards, and mail en masse fraudulent “spam” messages. Id. Furthermore, the 
Internet has enabled perpetrators to carry out traditional fraud schemes online:  
The types of investment fraud seen online mirror the frauds perpetrated over the phone or 
through the mail. Remember that fraudsters can use a variety of Internet tools to spread false 
information, including bulletin boards, online newsletters, spam, or chat. . . . All of these tools 
cost very little money and can be found at the fingertips of fraudsters. 
Id. For example, perpetrators use the Internet to implement “pump and dump” scams, pyramid 
schemes, off-shore schemes, and “risk-free” investment schemes. Id. 
 68. Schenck, supra note 66, at 5. Peter Schenck describes Ponzi schemes: “Ponzi schemes can 
involve investments in virtually anything, not simply stocks or bonds. Investors are generally promised 
very high returns and they are paid with funds obtained from later investors. Often early investors are 
so pleased with the return they leave their principle [sic] in the scheme.” Id.  
 69. Id. at 1-2. Market manipulation schemes fall into three classes:  
(1) Bribed Touts and Brokers:  
Traditional newsletters, internet analysts, and media stock experts are all potential candidates 
for improper influence by stock promoters, particularly of microcap stocks, to affect stock 
prices . . . . Touts also often provide false information about the stocks they push. A stock 
may also be pushed by brokers who are paid bribes to sell the stock. 
Id. 
(2) Pump and Dump Schemes:  
[These schemes] involve pushing the market up with false information and selling before 
reality sets in and the stock price drops. Boosting of stock can be done through internet chat 
rooms and sites such as Raging Bull, barrages of internet hype ostensibly from different 
sources, and posting false press releases from or about the company. 
Id.  
(3) Parking Schemes:  
These schemes make a stock’s market more volatile by removing much of the stock from 
trading. The stock is “parked” in nominee accounts to keep it off the market and make the 
price easier to manipulate. As the price rises, the parked stock is put back on the market.  
Id. 
 70. Id. at 3. Peter Schenck explains, “[c]hurning is the broker’s fraudulent repeated trading in a 
client’s stock portfolio to generate exorbitant fees based on multiple transactions. Successful 
prosecution relies on proof of substantial bleeding of the account with high frequency trades and with 
little client acquiescence.” Id. 
 71. Id. Self dealing may be described as follows: “Brokers or corporate employees controlling 
their company’s trades may fraudulently assign winning trades to their personal account and the losses 
to their customer’s or employer’s account.” Id. 
 72. Id. at 4. (“Brokers can skim money from trades by trading at a more advantageous price than 
the client had requested, and keeping the difference.”). 
 73. Id. (“Brokers may trade on their own prior to placing a customer’s order, hoping the large 
customer order will raise the price of the stock.”). 
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cooking schemes.74 Most notably, Enron’s executives “used thousands of 
off-the-book entities” to weave an “intricate spider’s web of deceit.”75 
Enron’s accounting jujitsu tricks enabled it to overstate corporate profits, 
understate corporate debts, inflate the corporate stock price, and ultimately 
ruin the financial stability of countless investors.76 The Judiciary 
Committee therefore drafted the Securities Fraud Statute flexibly to help 
federal prosecutors “keep pace with the most sophisticated and clever con 
artists” who will invent new fraud schemes in future years.77  
Third, Congress sought to deter securities fraud more effectively.78 
Before the enactment of the Securities Fraud Statute, federal prosecutors 
traditionally used the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes to convict 
securities defrauders, but these statutes carried maximum sentences of 
only five years.79 In the climate of American investors losing billions of 
dollars because of securities-related scandals, Congress believed that such 
minimal exposure to incarceration was unacceptable.80 Senator John 
McCain underscored this disgust:  
Until somebody responsible goes to jail for a significant amount of 
time, I am not sure that these people are going to get the message. 
Defrauding the shareholder has to carry a meaningful penalty . . . . 
The threat of real time in jail is a deterrent that will make people 
pay attention.81
 74. Id. at 3. Peter Schenck explains how corporate executives “cook the books”: “Corporate 
officials can manipulate their financial picture to present the façade of success by booking phony 
receivables and other accounting fraud. This lays the groundwork for boosting the value of stock, use 
of stock as collateral for loans or other activity, or purchasing other companies through stock 
exchange.” 
 75. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002).  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 11. 
 78. Id. (“[The CCFPA] also means providing for criminal penalties tough enough to make 
[potential perpetrators] think twice before defrauding the public.”). See also 148 CONG. REC. S6437 
(2002) (statement of Senator Daschle) (“The Leahy amendment . . . provides prosecutors with a new 
tool that is . . . tough enough to deter violations on the front end.”); 148 CONG. REC. S6439 (2002) 
(statement of Senator Leahy) (“The idea of 10 years in the slammer is going to focus the attention of 
those who are more interested in taking their money and hiding it in offshore bank accounts.”); 148 
CONG. REC. H4684 (2002) (statement of Representative Sensenbrenner) (“In addition, a distinct 
securities fraud crime is established with a maximum penalty of 25 years in jail. Again, the other body 
only calls for a 10-year penalty.”).  
 79. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (before July 2002); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (before July 2002). 
 80. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 11. 
 81. 148 CONG. REC. S6528 (statement of Senator McCain).  
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Hence, the Securities Fraud Statute has a tough twenty-five-year 
sentence82 that many in Congress believe will effectively deter potential 
violators.83  
III. ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITIES FRAUD STATUTE 
To decipher the elements of the Securities Fraud Statute, one must first 
examine the statute’s text. The Securities Fraud Statute reads as follows: 
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or 
artifice— 
 (1) to defraud any person in connection with any security of an 
issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l) or that is required 
to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)); or  
 (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, any money or property in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security of an issuer with a class of 
securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l) or that is required to file reports under 
section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78o(d));  
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, 
or both.84
The Judiciary Committee modeled the Securities Fraud Statute on the 
bank fraud85 and health-care fraud86 statutes,87 which are in turn modeled 
on the mail fraud88 and wire fraud89 statutes. Congress indicated that courts 
and prosecutors should interpret elements in the new statute by examining 
courts’ treatment of similarly worded elements in prosecutions under these 
other fraud provisions.90 Although there have not yet been any 
 82. See supra note 4. 
 83. See supra note 78. 
 84. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (West 2003).  
 85. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 2003). 
 86. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1347 (West 2003). 
 87. See supra note 58. 
 88. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2003). 
 89. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West 2003). 
 90. See supra note 58. Similarly, in another part of the Judiciary Report, the Senate underscores 
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prosecutions under the Securities Fraud Statute, there have been numerous 
prosecutions under these templates, particularly the mail fraud and wire 
fraud statutes.91
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1348(1) 
1. Intent To Defraud 
The Securities Fraud Statute states that to be convicted, defendants 
must “knowingly” execute or attempt to execute a fraudulent scheme.92 
The Judiciary Committee report dictates that “[t]he intent requirements [of 
the Securities Fraud Statute] are to be applied consistently with those 
found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, 1347,”93 the mail fraud,94 wire 
that “[t]he intent requirements are to be applied consistently with those found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 
(mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), 1347 (health care fraud).” S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 
20 (2002) (parentheticals added). As for the “scheme or artifice to defraud” requirement, the Judiciary 
Committee again suggested that courts and prosecutors should look to court interpretations of the mail 
fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and health care fraud statutes: “By covering all ‘schemes and artifices to 
defraud’ (see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1341, 1343, 1347), new § 1348 will be more accessible to 
investigators and prosecutors and will provide needed enforcement flexibility . . . .” Id. (emphasis 
added).  
 See also KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 4 (3d ed. Supp. 2002). Professor Brickey argues that courts will examine the mail fraud 
statute to determine the elements of the Securities Fraud Statute: 
There are obvious parallels between § 1348 and the mail fraud statute. Both statutes prohibit 
executing a “scheme or artifice” whose objective is “to defraud” or “to obtain money or 
property.” And while both statutes prohibit fraudulent schemes, neither defines what 
constitutes fraud. It should be noted, however, that as used in the mail fraud statute, “fraud” is 
a nontechnical and highly elastic concept that differs from “fraud” as embodied in the 
securities laws. It is likely that courts construing § 1348 will rely on case law interpreting the 
mail fraud statute—rather than the securities laws—to flesh out these terms.  
Id.  
 91. First, many more appellate cases deal with the mail and wire fraud statutes, as opposed to the 
bank and health care fraud statutes, because the mail and wire fraud statutes substantially predated the 
two later fraud statutes. Second, one should note that “[b]ecause the [mail fraud and wire fraud] 
statutes are in pari material, they are subject to the rule that they should be given parallel 
construction.” KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 126 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter BRICKEY] (internal citations omitted). 
 92. See supra note 4. 
 93. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 20. 
 94. The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2003), reads as follows:  
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish 
or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other 
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or 
spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, 
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing 
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited 
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fraud,95 bank fraud,96 and health care fraud97 statutes respectively. Thus, to 
determine the intent requirement courts should require in prosecutions 
under the Securities Fraud Statute, one must first consider prior judicial 
interpretations of the fraudulent intent requirement under these template 
statutes.  
Generally, to prove fraudulent intent, the government must demonstrate 
that the defendant intentionally devised or participated in a scheme with 
knowledge of the scheme’s fraudulent nature and with the intent that the 
scheme’s illicit objectives be achieved.98 For example, in United States v. 
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate 
carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be 
delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it 
is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation 
affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or 
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.  
 95. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West 2003), reads as follows: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television 
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or 
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, 
such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or 
both.  
 96. The bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 2003), reads as follows: 
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice— 
(1) to defraud a financial institution; or  
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, 
or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises;  
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 
 97. The health care fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1347 (West 2003), reads as follows: 
Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice— 
(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or  
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any of 
the money or property owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care benefit 
program,  
in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services, shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. If the violation results 
in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), such person shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and if the violation results in 
death, such person shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for 
life, or both. 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that the 
defendant must have scienter or fraudulent intent); United States v. Montani, 204 F.3d 761, 768 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (concluding that fraudulent intent requirement must be satisfied for mail fraud conviction); 
United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 334 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring that the defendant specifically 
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Bailey,99 a federal jury convicted two defendants of mail fraud for their 
participation in a scheme to defraud the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (the “FSLIC”). 
Because highly regarded and respected real estate brokers and the 
president of the FSLIC had assured the defendants that the predicate 
transaction was legitimate, however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed their convictions.100 The court emphasized that while the 
government did show that the two defendants “participated in a transaction 
that turned out to be part of a fraudulent scheme,”101 the government failed 
to show “willful participation in [the] scheme with knowledge of its 
fraudulent . . . intent that these illicit objectives be achieved.”102 Hence, to 
convict a defendant of mail fraud under the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of the fraudulent intent requirement, the government must 
show that (1) the defendant consciously understood his or her actions103 
and (2) specifically intended to execute a fraudulent scheme.104 This 
interpretation of the fraudulent intent requirement typifies other federal 
courts’ interpretation of the same element under the mail fraud, wire fraud, 
intend to harm or defraud victims); United States v. Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928, 940 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(necessitating fraudulent intent for mail fraud conviction); United States v. Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 
F.3d 472, 478 (6th Cir. 1999) (enumerating fraudulent intent as an element of mail fraud); United 
States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 945 (1999) (requiring 
specific intent to harm); United States v. Rodriguez, 140 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring 
specific intent to convict a defendant of bank fraud); United States v. Wicker, 80 F.3d 263, 267 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (requiring intent to defraud, not intent to violate mail fraud law); United States v. Costanzo, 
4 F.3d 658, 664 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that specific intent is an essential element, and guilt hinges on 
whether a defendant intended to defraud); United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1358 (2d Cir. 
1989) (declaring that specific intent requires intent to defraud, not intent to violate the statute), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989); United States v. Bailey, 859 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that the prosecution must present sufficient evidence that the defendant acted with the intent to 
defraud); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating “[b]ecause only ‘a 
scheme to defraud’ and not actual fraud is required, proof of fraudulent intent is critical.”), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980).  
 99. 859 F.2d 1265, 1273-75 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980), overruled on 
other grounds by, United States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
1010 (1989).  
 100. Bailey, 859 F.2d at 1273-75.  
 101. Id. at 1273. 
 102. Id. (quoting United States v. Price, 623 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 103. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. See also First Cir. Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 
§ 4.13 (1998) (“[Defendant] acted “knowingly” if he/she was conscious and aware of his/her actions, 
realized what he/she was doing or what was happening around him/her, and did not act because of 
ignorance, mistake or accident.”). See also id. at § 4.12 (providing same definition of “knowingly” in 
mail fraud context); Eighth Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. § 6.18.1341 (2003) (“To act with ‘intent to 
defraud’ means to act knowingly . . . . [With respect to false statements the defendant must have 
known the statement was untrue when made . . . .]”).  
 104. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. 
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and bank fraud statutes.105 Consequently, for the government to yield a 
conviction under the Securities Fraud Statute, courts should impose the 
same knowledge and specific intent requirements.106
2. Execute or Attempt To Execute a Scheme or Artifice To Defraud  
To convict a defendant under section 1 of the Securities Fraud Statute, 
the government must also prove that the defendant executed or attempted 
to execute “a scheme or artifice to defraud any person.”107 Like 
“knowingly,” the “scheme or artifice to defraud” language appears in the 
mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and health care fraud statutes.108 The 
Judiciary Committee thus suggested that courts should interpret “scheme 
 105. See supra note 98.  
 106. Because it is impossible to read the minds of fraud defendants, federal prosecutors will 
probably need to present circumstantial evidence to prove perpetrators’ fraudulent intent. See United 
States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980) (“The requisite 
intent under the federal mail and wire fraud statues may be inferred from the totality of the 
circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.”).  
 Jurors may infer the existence of a defendant’s fraudulent intent based on at least three types of 
circumstantial evidence. See Department of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual § 949, available at 
http://usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00949.htm (last updated October 1997) 
[hereinafter Criminal Resource Manual]. See also United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 n.34 
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Shani S. Kennedy & Rachel Price Flum, Mail and Wire Fraud, 39 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 817, 826, n.82 (2002).  
 First, jurors may infer fraudulent intent from a defendant’s statements and conduct. See United 
States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 
757 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983). See also Criminal Resource Manual, supra note 
106, at § 949 (explaining that if a securities fraud victim sends a complaint letter to the perpetrator, a 
federal prosecutor could offer the perpetrator’s subsequent participation in the scheme to prove that the 
perpetrator knowingly defrauded investors).  
 Second, jurors may infer fraudulent intent from evidence indicating that the perpetrator attempted 
to conceal his or her fraudulent activities. See Kennedy & Flum, supra note 106, at 826 & n.82. For 
example, in an Internet fraud case, the prosecutor could offer the fact that the perpetrator used a false 
screen name to prove that the perpetrator intentionally avoided detection.  
 Finally, jurors may infer fraudulent intent “from the modus operandi of the scheme.” United 
States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The District of Columbia Circuit noted that 
“[o]f course proof that someone was actually victimized by the fraud is good evidence of the 
schemer’s intent.” Id. (quoting United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (2d 
Cir. 1970). In other words, if the “necessary result” of a perpetrator’s securities fraud scheme is to 
injure others, jurors may infer fraudulent intent from the existence of the scheme itself. United States 
v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994). In holding that the government failed to produce 
sufficient evidence of the defendant’s specific intent, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized 
that “[w]hen the ‘necessary result’ of the actor’s scheme is to injure others, fraudulent intent may be 
inferred from the scheme itself. Where the scheme does not cause injury to the alleged victim as its 
necessary result, the government must produce evidence independent of the alleged scheme to show 
the defendant’s fraudulent intent.” Id.  
 107. See supra note 4. 
 108. See supra notes 94-97. 
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or artifice to defraud” based on prior judicial interpretations of the same 
language in these other statutes.109
Congress failed to define the words “scheme” or “artifice” in the mail 
fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and health care fraud statutes.110 Federal 
courts have traditionally been reluctant to limit definitively “scheme” and 
“artifice” and have accordingly construed the terms expansively.111 
Generally, courts analyze potential violations of the template fraud statutes 
based on elastic standards of “moral uprightness, fundamental honesty, 
fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of members of 
society.”112 For example, in United States v. Lindsey,113 a jury convicted 
the defendant of mail fraud. To obtain a higher resale profit, the defendant 
swapped the Illinois titles of cars he salvaged for Missouri titles containing 
no “salvaged” designation.114 Although the defendant’s act of swapping 
titles was legal under both Illinois and Missouri law,115 the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant nevertheless committed a 
“scheme or artifice to defraud” under the federal mail fraud statute.116 The 
court underscored that “the scheme is not to be measured by technicalities. 
Rather, the measure of fraud is its departure from moral uprightness, 
fundamental honesty, fair play and candid dealings in the general life of 
 109. See supra note 90.  
 110. See supra notes 94-97. 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Doherty, 969 F.2d 425, 428-20 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that one 
need not make a false representation to execute a scheme to defraud under the bank fraud statute), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 1002 (1992); United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 442 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984) (“It is well 
established that proof of every allegation is not required in order to convict; the government need only 
prove that the scheme to defraud existed.”); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (“Congress did not define ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ when it first coined that phrase, nor 
has it since. Instead that expression has taken on its present meaning from 111 years of case law.”) 
(internal citations omitted); Foshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205, 211 (8th Cir. 1933) (“To try to 
delimit ‘fraud’ by definition would tend to reward subtle and ingenious circumvention and is not 
done.”), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 674 (1934); BRICKEY, supra note 91, at 125 (“The [mail fraud] statute’s 
broad proscription against using the mails to execute a scheme to defraud provides virtually open-
ended liability, in part because the statute does not define the term ‘defraud.’”).  
 112. United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 
(1979). See also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (“[T]he words ‘to defraud’ in the 
mail fraud statute have the ‘common understanding’ of ‘wronging one in his property rights by 
dishonest methods or schemes,’ and ‘usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, 
deceit, chicane, or overreaching.’”) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987)). 
 113. 736 F.2d 433, 435 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 114. Id. The defendant, a licensed automobile rebuilder, bought and rebuilt six previously wrecked 
automobiles registered in Illinois. Id. at 434. The Illinois vehicle titles for the six cars designated that 
the cars were salvaged. Id. To sell the vehicles for a higher profit, the defendant exchanged the six 
Illinois vehicle titles for five Missouri titles and one Kentucky title containing no notation that the 
vehicles had been salvaged. Id.  
 115. Id. at 436. 
 116. Id. at 437. 
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members in society.”117 Because the defendant swapped the titles to 
deceive consumers, his actions satisfied the “scheme or artifice to defraud” 
requirement and the court affirmed his conviction.118  
The Judiciary Committee incorporated the “scheme or artifice to 
defraud” language into the Securities Fraud Statute to “provide needed 
enforcement flexibility and, in the context of publicly traded companies, 
protection against all the types [of] schemes and frauds which inventive 
criminals may devise in the future.”119 In 1995, however, the United States 
Supreme Court limited the extent to which federal courts may broadly 
construe “scheme or artifice to defraud.” In Neder v. United States,120 the 
Supreme Court held that materiality is an implicit element in the bank 
fraud statute,121 despite the fact that the plain meaning of the statute does 
not require materiality.122 Because the Court reasoned that the common 
law understanding of “defraud” always included a materiality 
requirement,123 the Court also held that the mail fraud and wire fraud 
statutes contain materiality elements.124 Under Neder, “a false statement is 
material if it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of 
influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking [sic] body to which it was 
addressed.’”125 Hence, courts should construe the “scheme or artifice to 
defraud” language found in the Securities Fraud Statute expansively, 
subject to the Neder limitation that defendants’ schemes must be capable 
of influencing the decision-making processes of their intended victims. 
3. In Connection with any Security of a Publicly Traded Company 
The government can sustain a conviction under the Securities Fraud 
Statute only if the defendant defrauds a person (a) “in connection with any 
security” (b) “of an issuer with a class of securities registered under 
section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or that 
is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)).”126 The “class of securities” clause is 
 117. Id. at 436. 
 118. Id. at 437. 
 119. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 20 (2002). 
 120. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 
 121. Id. at 25. 
 122. See supra note 96. 
 123. Neder, 527 U.S. at 21-23. 
 124. Id. at 25. 
 125. Id. at 16 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)) (quoting Kungys v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).  
 126. See supra note 4. 
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relatively straightforward: sections 12127 and 15(d)128 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 SEA”) encompass all securities publicly 
traded on the national stock exchanges. Courts generally interpret the word 
“security” broadly to include “notes; stocks; debentures; oil, gas or other 
mineral rights; investment contracts; insurance products; bank products; 
employee benefit plans; voting trust certificates; certificates of deposit; 
equipment trust certificates; and warrants, options and commodity 
futures.”129 The Securities Fraud Statute thus applies to any scheme or 
artifice to defraud “in connection with any security” of any publicly traded 
company.  
Federal courts generally interpret the “in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a security” language found in section 10(b) of the 1934 SEA130 
 127. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l (West 2003) reads in relevant part as follows:  
It shall be unlawful for any member, broker, or dealer to effect any transaction in any security 
(other than an exempted security) on a national securities exchange unless a registration is 
effective as to such security for such exchange in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder.  
15 U.S.C.A. § 78l(a).  
 128. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(d) (West 2003) reads in relevant part as follows:  
Each issuer which has filed a registration statement containing an undertaking which is or 
becomes operative under this subsection as in effect prior to August 20, 1964, and each issuer 
which shall after such date file a registration statement which has become effective pursuant 
to the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, . . . shall file with the Commission, in accordance 
with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors, such supplementary and periodic 
information, documents, and reports as may be required pursuant to section 78m of this title 
in respect of a security registered pursuant to section 78l of this title. The duty to file under 
this subsection shall be automatically suspended if and so long as any issue of securities of 
such issuer is registered pursuant to section 78l of this title. The duty to file under this 
subsection shall also be automatically suspended as to any fiscal year, other than the fiscal 
year within which such registration statement became effective, if, at the beginning of such 
fiscal year, the securities of each class to which the registration statement relates are held of 
record by less than three hundred persons. For the purposes of this subsection, the term 
“class” shall be construed to include all securities of an issuer which are of substantially 
similar character and the holders of which enjoy substantially similar rights and privileges. 
 129. Steven Amchen, Jessica Cordova, & Paul Cicero, Securities Fraud, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1037, 1058 (2002).  
 130. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2003) reads in relevant part as follows: 
 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange 
  . . . .  
 (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based 
swap agreement (as defined by section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors. 
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and SEC Rule 10b-5131 expansively.132 For example, in United States v. 
O’Hagan,133 the Supreme Court endorsed the “misappropriation theory” of 
insider trading under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.134 Under this theory, a 
person who trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential 
information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the 
source of the information, is guilty of criminal insider trading.135 The 
Court reasoned that such transactions are “in connection with” securities 
trading because “the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the 
fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when . . . he 
[subsequently] uses the information to purchase or sell securities.”136 
Because the “in connection with” language in section 1 of the Securities 
Fraud Statute is not followed by “the purchase or sale of any security,” 
courts should interpret the wording equally, or even more broadly than the 
Supreme Court in O’Hagan.  
B. 18 U.S.C. § 1348(2) 
1. Intent To Defraud 
Like section 1 of the Securities Fraud Statute, section 2 states that to be 
convicted, a defendant must “knowingly” execute or attempt to execute a 
scheme or artifice to defraud.137 Thus, the same fraudulent intent analysis 
 131. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (West 2003) reads as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange,  
 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or  
 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person,  
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1997); Superintendant of Ins. of 
New York v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-13 (1971); McGann v. Ernst and Young, 102 
F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 863 (1983) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court construed the phrase ‘in connection with’ flexibly to 
include deceptive practices ‘touching’ the sale of securities, a relationship which has been described as 
very tenuous indeed”) (internal citations omitted); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 
(2d Cir. 1968).  
 133. 521 U.S. at 653. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 652. 
 136. Id. at 656. 
 137. See supra note 4. 
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that applies to section 1 of the Securities Fraud Statute applies to section 2 
as well. To establish fraudulent intent under the mail fraud, wire fraud, and 
bank fraud statutes, the government must demonstrate that (1) the 
defendant consciously understood his or her actions138 and (2) specifically 
intended to execute a fraudulent scheme.139 Courts should impose these 
same intent requirements in order for the government to secure a 
conviction under section 2 of the Securities Fraud Statute.  
2. Scheme or Artifice To Obtain Money or Property by Means of False 
or Fraudulent Pretenses, Representations, or Promises 
While section 1 of the Securities Fraud Statute addresses a “scheme or 
artifice to defraud,” section 2 of the statute pertains to a “scheme or 
artifice to obtain by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, any money or property.”140 As noted earlier, 
federal courts generally interpret the words “scheme” and “artifice” 
broadly to encourage prosecutorial flexibility.141 The term “false or 
fraudulent pretenses” similarly encompasses a broad class of statements 
and assertions.142 For example, in United States v. Blastos,143 the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s bank fraud conviction 
using the following flexible definition of “false and fraudulent pretenses”:  
[A]ny false statements or assertions that concern a material aspect 
of the matter in question, that were either known to be untrue when 
made or that were made with reckless indifference to their truth and 
that were made with the intent to defraud. They include actual, 
direct false statements as well as half-truths and the knowing 
concealment of facts.144
 138. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.  
 139. Id. 
 140. See supra note 4. 
 141. See supra notes 111-12. 
 142. United States v. Blastos, 258 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2001). See also United States v. Dillman, 
15 F.3d 384, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court’s jury instruction that “[a] statement or 
representation is ‘false’ or ‘fraudulent’ within the meaning of [the bank fraud] statute when . . . it is 
known to be untrue or is made with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity.”); United States v. 
Gunther, 876 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding same language in jury instruction). The “to 
obtain money or property” requirement should rarely, if ever, present a prosecutorial obstacle because 
the ultimate objective of almost all securities fraud schemes is to obtain money or property. 
 143. 258 F.3d at 28.  
 144. Id. at 28-29. 
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Similarly, in United States v. Dillman,145 the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court’s instruction to the jury that a statement 
or representation “is ‘false’ or ‘fraudulent’ within the meaning of [the 
bank fraud] statute when it pertains to a material fact; it is known to be 
untrue or is made with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity; and is 
made or caused to be made with intent to defraud.”146 Thus, under both 
Blastos and Dillman, a false or fraudulent representation (1) pertains to a 
material fact, (2) is known or recklessly not known by the perpetrator to be 
false, (3) and is intentionally made by the perpetrator in order to defraud 
another person.147 The Blastos and Dillman interpretation of the “false or 
fraudulent pretenses” requirement typifies other judicial interpretations of 
the same element;148 courts should apply the Blastos and Dillman test to 
determine whether the government has satisfied its burden of proof under 
section 2 of the Securities Fraud Statute. 
3. In Connection with the Purchase or Sale of any Security of a 
Publicly Traded Company 
Like section 1 of the Securities Fraud Statute, section 2 applies only to 
schemes that connect to the security of any publicly traded company.149 
Unlike section 1 of the Securities Fraud Statute, which applies to fraud 
schemes “in connection with any security,” section 2 of the statute applies 
to fraud schemes “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”150 Nevertheless, federal courts should interpret the language 
broadly.  
First, federal courts generally interpret the term “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security” expansively.151 For example, in SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company,152 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that under Rule 10b-5, perpetrators make false and misleading assertions 
“in connection with” securities trading “whenever [such] assertions are 
made . . . in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing 
 145. 15 F.3d at 392-93. 
 146. Id. at 392.
 147. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 210 F.3d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lilly, 
983 F.2d 300, 302-04 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1403 (5th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 648-50 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 
1450, 1456-58 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 149. See supra note 4.  
 150. See supra note 4 (emphasis added). 
 151. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text. 
 152. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (in banc). 
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public,”153 regardless of whether “the makers of [the] misleading 
statement[s] also participated in pertinent securities transactions.”154 This 
broad interpretation of the “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security” language exemplifies treatment of the term by other federal 
courts.155  
Second, when drafting the Securities Fraud Statute, the Judiciary 
Committee specifically cited with strong disapproval SEC v. Zandford.156 
In Zandford, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals took a minority position 
and relied on a narrow interpretation of the “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security” language to dismiss the SEC’s action 
against a securities broker who sold the securities of both an elderly man 
in poor health and of the elderly man’s mentally challenged daughter, and 
then pocketed the proceeds.157 The Judiciary Committee declared that 
rather than reading the Securities Fraud Statute to “require proof of 
technical elements from the securities laws,”158 courts should interpret the 
Securities Fraud Statute expansively to facilitate enforcement.159 
Consequently, courts should interpret the “in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security” broadly, in conformance with federal precedent 
and Congress’ intent.  
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE SECURITIES FRAUD STATUTE ON PROSECUTIONS 
OF SECURITIES DEFRAUDERS 
Because there have not yet been any prosecutions under the Securities 
Fraud Statute, one may only theoretically consider the extent to which it 
will affect federal securities fraud prosecutions. On the one hand, it 
appears that the Securities Fraud Statute will significantly impact 
securities fraud prosecutions. First, the statute will make it easier, in a 
limited class of cases, for prosecutors to convict securities defrauders.160 
Even if a defendant uses interstate commerce or the mail or wire systems 
to further a fraudulent scheme, it can sometimes be difficult for federal 
 153. Id. at 862. 
 154. Id. at 860. 
 155. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. 
 156. 238 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 2001). The Judiciary Committee cited Zandford to explain why 
federal prosecutors usually decide not to charge willful violations of securities laws and statutes. S. 
REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002).   
 157. Zandford, 238 F.3d at 566.  
 158. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 20. 
 159. Id. Also, Federal courts generally interpret the term “in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security” flexibly. See supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.   
 160.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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prosecutors to prove the actual existence of a transaction, letter, e-mail, 
fax, or phone-call.161 Under the Securities Fraud Statute, prosecutors will 
not have to prove these elements,162 which only tangentially relate to the 
crux of the defendant’s scheme—intentional misrepresentations regarding 
securities.163  
Second, the elements of the Securities Fraud Statute are flexible 
enough to enable federal prosecutors to keep up with the most complex 
new fraud schemes that relate to securities of publicly traded companies.164 
Most importantly, federal prosecutors can use the new statute to prosecute 
the type of complex corporate book-cooking schemes that Enron’s 
executives orchestrated.165 Also, prosecutors will most likely be able to 
use the statute to combat many broker-initiated schemes, including 
churning, self-dealing, skimming, and front-running.166 All of these 
broker-initiated schemes entail fraudulent intent, the execution or 
attempted execution of a scheme or artifice to defraud, and connections to 
the securities of publicly traded companies.167  
Finally, the strict twenty-five-year sentence the Judiciary Committee 
injected into the Securities Fraud Statute will likely deter some potential 
violators and thus enable federal agents and prosecutors to target 
particularly egregious schemes.168 Since the enactment of the Securities 
Fraud Statute, numerous law firms in the United States have posted 
interpretation memorandums on their websites warning clients about 
potential criminal liability under the new provision.169 Such publicity 
about the new statute, combined with its harsh twenty-five-year maximum 
sentence, should deter violators and empower federal prosecutors and 
investigators to combat particularly insidious, deceitful conduct. 
 161. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (“Currently, in securities fraud cases, prosecutors must rely on 
generic mail and wire charges that . . . require prosecutors to carry the sometimes awkward burden of 
proving the use of the mail or the interstate wires to carry out the fraud.”).   
 162. See supra note 4.   
 163. See supra note 161. According to the Judiciary Committee, the Securities Fraud Statute will 
eliminate this “awkward burden.” Id.   
 164. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.  
 165. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2-6, 10-11, 14, 20, 30. After all, the Enron fiasco was 
Congress’ primary impetus for enacting the flexible and adaptable Securities Fraud Statute. 
 166. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. The probable elements of section 1 of the 
Securities Fraud Statute may be applied to each of these schemes.   
 167. See supra notes 70-73, 86-136, and accompanying text.   
 168. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.   
 169. See, e.g., Luis Avila, Lisa Sawyer Cadet, and Janet Love, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Lord, 
Bissell, & Brook, LLP, available at http://www.lordbissel.com/newstand.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 
2002); Robert Saville, Laurence Hirsch, Richard Swanson, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Summary and 
Analysis of Criminal Provisions, Thelen, Reid, & Priest, LLP, available at http://www.thelenreid. 
com/articles/article/art_138.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).   
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While it may seem that the Securities Fraud Statute will significantly 
impact federal securities fraud prosecutions, three significant factors 
suggest that the Securities Fraud Statute will only nominally impact 
securities fraud prosecutions. First, the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes 
are written and interpreted flexibly,170 and these “catch-all” provisions 
embrace nearly all securities fraud schemes. After all, it is extremely 
unlikely that a securities defrauder could orchestrate a scam without at 
some point using the mail or wire systems in furtherance of his or her 
scheme.171 Although the Securities Fraud Statute obviates the need for 
prosecutors to prove the actual existence of an illegal letter, e-mail, fax, or 
phone-call, proving the existence of these documents and transmissions 
rarely presents a prosecutorial hurdle: 
The government may use circumstantial evidence to prove the mails 
were used to further an alleged scheme to defraud. In effect this 
relieves the government of the burden of proving who actually 
mailed the communications in question and precisely how and when 
they were mailed. The proof may consist of evidence concerning 
routine office procedures for processing documents like those in 
question or evidence of conduct that is consistent with a response to 
the material allegedly mailed.172  
Because the SOA increases the prison sentence for mail fraud and wire 
fraud from five years to twenty years,173 these two statutes constitute very 
effective tools for federal prosecutors.  
Second, even though the Securities Fraud Statute eliminates the need 
for prosecutors to prove technical elements such as reliance174 and the use 
of interstate commerce or mail175 that inhere in section 10(b)176 and Rule 
10b-5,177 the elements of the Securities Fraud Statute and these two other 
securities laws substantially overlap. All three laws require the 
 170. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.  
 171. Interview with Kathleen F. Brickey, James Carr Professor of Criminal Jurisprudence at 
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, Mo. (Jan. 16, 2003). 
 172. BRICKEY, supra note 91, at 183.   
 173. Compare the maximum sentences under the current mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 
(West 2003), and current wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West 2003), with the same provisions 
before July 1, 2002.   
 174. See supra note 20.   
 175. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997) (stating that the use of interstate 
commerce or the mail system is a necessary element of Rule 10b-5).  
 176. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2003). 
 177. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).   
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government to prove fraudulent intent,178 the existence of material,179 
substantive fraud,180 and a connection between the scheme and any 
security.181 Furthermore, it is very difficult to envision a prosecutable 
securities fraud scheme on which no person relied or in which the 
defendant failed to utilize interstate commerce. Thus, the mere fact that the 
Securities Fraud Statute does not require prosecutors to satisfy the reliance 
and interstate commerce or interstate mail elements adds very little, if 
anything, to the prosecutorial utility of the new statute. 
Third, the Securities Fraud Statute will not enable prosecutors to target 
some of the most pervasive and pernicious schemes that have spawned 
during the past decade. Because the Securities Fraud Statute applies only 
to schemes that connect to publicly traded securities, federal prosecutors 
will be unable to utilize the new statute to combat Micro-Cap schemes, 
prime bank schemes, and many Internet transaction schemes.182 Securities 
and commodity fraud cost United States investors approximately $40 
billion per year.183 Micro-Cap fraud accounts for approximately $10 
billion of this annual amount.184 Micro-Cap fraud will rarely be susceptible 
to prosecution under the new statute, however, because it almost always 
involves risky stock in “start-up companies with little or no track 
record.”185 Prime bank schemes emerged “as a significant problem in the 
late 1990’s”186 and accounted for over one hundred federal criminal 
investigations as of March, 2002.187 Because prime bank schemes involve 
 178. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976) (concluding that defendant was 
not liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because negligence does not satisfy the intent 
requirement); United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 967 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that government 
met intent requirement by proving that defendant sold a deliberately forged Japanese government bond 
to investors); supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.  
 179. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (requiring materiality for cases brought 
under Rule 10b-5); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (requiring 
materiality under similar federal securities statute); Lewis v. Chrysler Corp, 949 F.2d 644, 651-53 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (applying materiality test in civil Rule 10b-5 case); see also supra notes 121-25 and 
accompanying text. 
 180. See Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (enumerating substantive fraud as 
element of Rule 10b-5 action); see also supra notes 107-25, 140-48 and accompanying text. 
 181. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (requiring deceit “in connection 
with” the purchase or sale of a security in order to hold defendant liable under Rule 10b-5); supra 
notes 126-36, 149-59 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Economic Crimes Unit, supra note 1. 
 184. Id. (“Micro-Cap or ‘Chop stocks’ constitute a vast underworld of the securities markets that 
accounts for a $10 billion a year business.”). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Joel E. Leising & Michael McGarry, Prime Bank/High Yield Investment Schemes, United 
States Attorneys’ Bulletin 10, 11 (Mar. 2002). 
 187. Id. 
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investments in “fanciful” securities, these schemes will be impervious to 
prosecution under the Securities Fraud Statute.188 Finally, like Micro-Cap 
schemes, Internet transaction schemes also account for approximately $10 
billion in annual losses.189 Except for schemes relating to publicly traded 
companies, however, federal prosecutors will be unable to use the new 
statute to attack traditional Internet schemes perpetrated online, as well as 
schemes involving fake internal memos from investment firms that induce 
recipients to invest online in artificial securities.190  
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE SECURITIES FRAUD STATUTE 
Congress should expand the reach of the Securities Fraud Statute by 
broadening the language to encompass any fraudulent scheme connected 
to a “contrived security.” The term “contrived security” would be defined 
as follows:  
Any false, fraudulent, illegal, or illegally marketed security, note, 
stock, or bond that a person markets or attempts to market, knowing 
or recklessly not knowing the investment to be false, fraudulent, 
illegal, or illegally marketed.191
The “contrived security” language would expand the reach of the 
Securities Fraud Statute beyond the scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
by prohibiting not only schemes in which perpetrators deceitfully market 
securities of publicly traded companies but also schemes in which 
 188. See supra note 69. 
 189. Economic Crimes Unit, supra note 1 (“The North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA) has estimated that Internet-related stock fraud is currently the second most 
common form of investment fraud. That same source estimated that investors lose $10 billion per year 
(or $1 million per hour) to this type of fraud.”). 
 190. Actors frequently use the Internet to carry out traditional fraud schemes as well as “internal 
memo” fraud schemes. See supra note 67. Although the government may prosecute these Internet 
schemes under the wire fraud statute, the Securities Fraud Statute carries a higher maximum sentence 
and relates more directly to the crux of perpetrators’ schemes—intentional misrepresentations about 
securities.   
 191. This definition is partially derived from 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(b)(1) (West 2003), which defines 
the word “security” for purposes of the 1933 Securities Act. The definition would also apply to the 
following types of investments: treasury stock; security futures; debentures; certificates of interest or 
participation in profit-sharing agreements; collateral-trust certificates; preorganization certificates or 
subscriptions; transferable shares; investment contracts; voting-trust certificates; certificates of deposit 
for securities; fractional undivided interests in oil, gas or other mineral rights; puts, calls, straddles, 
options, or privileges on securities; groups or indexes of securities; puts, calls, options, or privileges 
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency; interests or instruments 
commonly known as a “securities”; or certificates of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificates for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing. Cf. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(b)(1).  
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perpetrators market fraudulent securities. While section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 apply to the earlier class of fraud schemes, they are wholly 
inapplicable to the latter class of schemes.192 Thus, the new statute would 
broaden the scope of federal securities fraud prohibitions.193  
More importantly, the “contrived security” language would enable 
federal prosecutors to combat the particularly pervasive and pernicious 
schemes that have thrived during the past two decades.194 First, federal 
prosecutors would be able to use the Securities Fraud Statute to combat 
Micro-Cap fraud.195 Because Micro-Cap fraud almost always entails the 
sale of high-risk stock in non-publicly-traded companies,196 the schemes 
are currently immune from prosecution under the Securities Fraud Statute. 
Because a “contrived security” would include, inter alia, “illegally 
marketed” investments,197 the new language would enable the government 
to prosecute most Micro-Cap schemes.  
Second, the “contrived security” language would enable the 
government to use the Securities Fraud Statute to prosecute prime bank 
schemes.198 Because prime bank schemes usually involve “fanciful” 
securities,199 they are immune from prosecution under the current version 
of the Securities Fraud Statute. The “contrived security” language would 
enable the government to prosecute prime bank schemes by prohibiting 
people from knowingly or recklessly marketing such “fanciful” 
securities.200 Because the number of prime bank schemes has risen 
significantly in recent years, prosecutors need the statutory authority to 
legally combat them.201
Finally, the “contrived security” language would enable the 
government to prosecute nearly all Internet fraud schemes not currently 
prohibited by the Securities Fraud Statute.202 Most importantly, the 
 192. See supra notes 130-32, 151-55 and accompanying text. 
 193. Compare a version of the Securities Fraud Statute containing language that extends its 
prohibition to contrived securities with the language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, supra notes 130-
31. 
 194. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 65, 182-85 and accompanying text. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See supra note 191 and proposed statutory text. 
 198. See supra notes 66, 186-88 and accompanying text. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See supra note 191 and proposed statutory text. 
 201. See supra notes 67, 186-87 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra notes 67, 189-90. The government could either charge an online securities 
defrauder under both the Securities Fraud Statute and the wire fraud statute, or alternatively, charge the 
defrauder under whichever provision applies more precisely to the defendant’s conduct. See supra 
notes 67, 188-89 and accompanying text. 
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government could use the new statute to prosecute schemes in which 
criminals use the Internet to induce trusting people to invest in false 
securities.203 For example, if a perpetrator sends a bulk e-mail message 
that appears to be an internal memo from a major investment firm, and the 
e-mail induces recipients to invest in false securities,204 the “contrived 
security” language would enable the government to prosecute the scheme. 
Furthermore, the language would enable the government to prosecute 
traditional securities fraud schemes implemented online,205 even when the 
schemes do not connect to publicly traded securities. The government 
could also use the statute to prosecute online Ponzi schemes, which rarely 
involve investments in publicly traded securities.206 In short, the 
“contrived security” language would enable the federal government to 
combat Internet fraud schemes connecting to both publicly-traded and 
non-publicly-traded securities.207  
Of course, in many instances, federal prosecutors would still be able 
use the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes to prosecute Micro-Cap, prime 
bank, and Internet schemes. Rather than charging a defendant with merely 
mail fraud and wire fraud, however, it would be wise for the prosecutor in 
these situations to charge the defendant with mail fraud, wire fraud, and 
securities fraud under the new statute. As a practical matter, it would make 
more sense to jurors for the government to charge securities defrauders 
with securities fraud, rather than merely mail fraud and wire fraud. This is 
because the defendant’s use of the mail or wire systems bears no relation 
to the crux of his or her scheme—intentionally lying about a security to 
receive an unwarranted gain. Furthermore, while the mail fraud and wire 
fraud statutes require prosecutors to prove that a defendant used the mail 
or wire systems in furtherance of his or her scheme, the Securities Fraud 
Statute lacks these jurisdictional elements.208 Because it is occasionally 
difficult to prove a defendant’s use of the mail or wire systems, this would 
make it easier for federal prosecutors in such cases to convict securities 
defrauders.  
 203. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.  
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See supra notes 68, 190 and accompanying text.  
 207. See supra note 191 and proposed statutory text. 
 208. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348. See supra 
note 51 and accompanying text. 
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In conclusion, Congress enacted the Securities Fraud Statute to close 
major gaps in federal securities and fraud laws, as well as to provide 
prosecutors with an elastic statute that can be applied to multifarious 
securities fraud schemes. On the one hand, it appears that the statute will 
significantly impact securities fraud prosecutions because the government 
will no longer need to prove the defendant’s use of the interstate mail or 
wire systems. Also, the flexibly written statute will enable prosecutors to 
keep up with the most complex new fraud schemes and target the most 
egregious and deceitful scams. On the other hand, it seems that the statute 
will minimally impact securities fraud prosecutions because the conduct it 
illegalizes is already prohibited to a large extent by the mail and wire fraud 
statutes, as well as section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Most importantly, it is 
impossible for prosecutors to use the new statute to combat Micro-Cap 
fraud, prime bank fraud, and most Internet securities fraud. To rectify 
these problems, Congress should add language to the Securities Fraud 
Statute that will allow federal prosecutors and agents to target all schemes 
based on the knowing or reckless marketing of “contrived” securities. 
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